The panel deliberated for six hours. Its finding, issued in writing the following week, was narrow, and both the company and the union, for opposite reasons, would come to regard its narrowness as its strength. The panel found that on the morning of Flight 207, Captain Moser had ordered the removal of a ticketed passenger without cause recognized by the company's manual or by law, had refused to examine the documents the passenger presented or the manifest the company provided, had persisted in the order after the purser identified its unlawfulness, and had thereby committed a serious breach of his command responsibilities, independent of the passenger's identity, which the panel recorded as an aggravating irrelevance: the breach would have been identical, the panel wrote, had the passenger been any person in the company's care. On that ground, and on the hearing's own record, the company terminated Captain Gerry Moser's employment for cause. The nine historical complaints were not made a ground of the termination. They were referred, in the panel's closing paragraph, to the special committee's report, where they belonged, as the company's account to settle with itself and with the people who had filed them. The union filed its grievance within the contractual period, on the pattern question and on proportionality, and there the matter rested, inside the machinery, unresolved within the frame of that year, a pending thing, which the report, when it came, would record as pending, because the report had a rule, set by Desai at the outset and kept to the last page: nothing in it was to be stated as finished that was not finished.
Desai delivered the report to the special committee in the seventh week of the investigation, three hundred and eleven pages with appendices: the forensic reconstruction, the facing pages; the change log and the vendor's copy; Marconi's ticket and Marconi's resignation; Elaine Forsyth's logbooks, copied entire, with her receipt for the page count appended; Bergman's folder, itemized; Fiona Gallagher's statement in full, with her resignation attached, as she had asked; the duty manager's incident file; the hearing panel's findings; and a set of recommendations that read, Samuel thought when the report reached him as a courtesy copy the night before the board meeting, less like recommendations than like the specifications of a machine the company should have been all along. She presented it to the committee in person, in a session that lasted most of a day, and at the end of it the retired judge who chaired the committee asked her the question that chairmen ask when the work is done. "If the board adopts all of this, Ms. Desai, what will be different in five years?"
"What will be different," Desai said, "is that when a passenger writes to this company to say that a thing happened to them in its care, the letter will go to a place with a name and a person and a deadline, and the person will answer it, and the answer will be counted by an instrument that no one in Flight Operations can reclassify, because reclassification will not exist. And when the board asks, as boards must, what the number is, the number will be the number of letters that arrived. That is all. It is not a culture, Judge. Culture is what people call the sum of what the paperwork permits. Fix the paperwork, and attend to it, and in five years the culture will be the name you give to what the paperwork made ordinary."
The answering took eleven weeks, and it was done by name.