There were 2,841 civilian complaints over the four-year period.
Sustained: 94.
Three point three percent.
The report spent eleven pages on how that number was produced, and it was the eleven pages that did the most damage, because they were not about racism or violence. They were about forms.
To file a complaint, a resident had to appear in person at one of two locations, during business hours, with photo identification, and sign a form that contained — in bold, directly above the signature line — a notice that false reporting was a criminal offense punishable by up to a year in jail.
That notice was legally accurate and was placed there in 2009 on the advice of counsel.
Of complaints initiated by phone, 61 percent were never completed, because the complainant never came in.
Of complaints that were completed, 44 percent were closed as Not Sustained, which the report noted was “a finding that requires no action by the Department and communicates to the complainant that the matter was investigated, which it was, and resolved, which it was not.”
And then there was the matter of Marcus Teale.
Investigators found eleven cases in four years in which a complainant withdrew after a phone call from the department. They interviewed nine of them. All nine described some version of the same conversation: the duration, the testimony, the warning about false reporting.
The civilian clerks who made those calls were not lying and were not freelancing. They were reading from a laminated card that had been approved in 2011 and updated once, in 2016, when the phone number changed.
The report reproduced the card in full as Exhibit 58.
It is, in context, one of the most chilling documents in the entire record, and it contains no untrue statements of any kind.
In month six, the investigation produced the thing that nobody had planned for and that changed the shape of the ending.
A sergeant named Patrice Ndiaye, nineteen years on, assigned to a different precinct, requested a meeting with federal investigators through her own attorney.
She brought a box.
Inside the box were copies of fourteen memoranda she had written to three different lieutenants and two captains over a period of six years, each one flagging a specific officer, a specific pattern, a specific recommendation.
Each one had a routing stamp.
None had a response.
The last memo in the box, dated fourteen months before Riverside Park, concerned a different officer entirely. It read, in part:
I am aware that this is the fourth memorandum I have submitted on this subject and that I have received no written response to the previous three. I am submitting it anyway, in writing, through channels, because I would like there to be a record that somebody said this before it happens rather than after.
When Moreno-Hale read that sentence, she put the page down and went and stood by the window for a while.
Sergeant Ndiaye testified for six hours. She was asked, at the end, whether she had ever considered going outside the chain.
“Every time,” she said.
“Why didn’t you?”
“Because the people I’d be going outside the chain for still have to work here after I’m gone.” She folded her hands. “And because I believed, every single time, that the next memo would be the one somebody read. That’s not stupidity. That’s the only thing that lets you stay. The day you stop believing it you have to quit, and then there’s nobody inside writing memos at all.”
The findings report’s final recommendation — the one the city fought hardest and lost — was built directly out of her testimony: a requirement that every supervisory concern submitted in writing receive a written disposition within thirty days, logged, auditable, and reviewable by an independent monitor.
It is, on paper, the least dramatic reform in the entire consent decree.
Moreno-Hale called it the most important one in every speech she gave for the next three years.
Caldwell’s own interview took place in month four, in a conference room with a view of a parking structure.
Donnelly sat to his left. A lawyer from the city attorney’s office sat against the wall taking notes and saying nothing.
Moreno-Hale was not in the room. That was deliberate. The interviewer was a career attorney named Peter Lindqvist, who was fifty-six, soft-spoken, and had conducted something over nine hundred of these.
It lasted five hours and twenty minutes.
Lindqvist did not ask about the Taser until hour three.
He spent the first three hours asking about ordinary days. What time did Caldwell start. What did he do first. How did he decide where to drive. Did he have favorite blocks. Why those blocks. How did he decide who to talk to. Walk me through Tuesday the 11th. Walk me through the 14th.
It was, Donnelly said afterward, the most effective interrogation he had ever watched, and not one question in it was aggressive.
Somewhere in hour two, Caldwell said something that appears in the findings report on page 88, attributed only to Officer A:
LINDQVIST: How do you decide that someone is nervous?
CALDWELL: You just — it’s how they react when they see you.
LINDQVIST: How do most people react when they see you?
CALDWELL: Most people don’t react.
LINDQVIST: So reacting is unusual.
CALDWELL: Right.
LINDQVIST: What does reacting look like?
CALDWELL: Looking away. Or looking at you too long. Picking up their pace. Or stopping.
LINDQVIST: Officer, I want to make sure I’m understanding. Looking away is a sign. Looking at you is a sign. Walking faster is a sign. Stopping is a sign.