The review interviewed Howard Zeller on a Tuesday, in a conference room on a lower floor that the outside firm had taken for its work, with the river of the company's ordinary business audible through the walls and none of it, for the length of the interview, any of his concern. He came with his own counsel, as was his right and as the committee's letter had advised him he might, and he answered the reviewers' questions in the order they were asked, with the fluency that had made his reputation in treasury matters and with a growing, visible understanding that fluency was not the currency of this room. The reviewers were interested in chronology. When had the draft certificate been prepared. At the advisers' request, in the ordinary course. When had he first become aware of the letter of intent. He had been aware, he said, of real-estate discussions — the phrase he had prepared — for some months. The reviewers asked him to look at the treasury analysis, from his own files, earmarking the disposition's proceeds for the revolver's repayment, and to say whether the analysis had been prepared by his department. It had. They asked whether a certificate stating that no material disposal was planned or contemplated could be reconciled with an analysis, prepared by his own department, of the proceeds of a signed disposition. Zeller's counsel asked for a recess, and got one, and in the recess the sounds of the building went on around them like water around a stone.
His position, when the interview resumed and in the written submission his counsel filed with the committee two days later, was the position the record would keep: that the certificate was a draft, never signed, never delivered, a form awaiting a closing that had not occurred; that a draft could not deceive anyone, being by its nature a proposal to say something rather than the saying of it; that the letter of intent was exploratory, conditional, and had lapsed in prospect the moment the extension stalled; and that he had relied, as an officer was entitled to rely, on the scope of his own department, in which the certificate's language was standard and the real-estate strategy was not his to approve. It was not a stupid defense. It was the defense of a man who had spent his career inside the doctrine that documents mean what their function says they mean — drafts are drafts, certificates are closing-day things, intentions are the chairman's department. What it could not survive was the question the forensic accountants had been hired to ask, which was not a question about doctrine at all. It was about the forecast. For the certificate had not been the only paper to pass over Zeller's desk that rested on the company's future, and the review had begun to pull the thread that connected the packet to the plan: if the extension's own forecasts — the thirteen weeks, the year beyond them, the plan the lenders had been asked to consent to — had been prepared by a treasury that knew the revolver was to be repaid from a secret sale, then the forecasts themselves carried the secret in their numbers like a stone in a shoe. The accountants found, in the second year's projections, a deleveraging step — a neat, unexplained improvement in the debt balance, footnoted as asset optimization — that matched the letter's proceeds to within a rounding error. The plan the board had presented, the plan on the strength of which the company had asked its creditors to extend two billion dollars of life, had the sale of the fourteen stores already in it, in disguise, doing quiet work. The woman at the visitors' end of the table had asked about week nine's receivables. The reviewers, reading year two, understood that she had been asking at the shallow end of a pool whose depth she had already sounded.