The scissors fund's engagement with Fairbank closed in its marketing materials, where the position appeared, in the year's letter to its investors, as an instance of the fund's constructive approach to complex situations, its analysts' early identification of governance catalysts, its disciplined exit. The description was not false in any particular a lawyer could have circled; it was false the way a map is false, by selection, and it joined the great library of such letters in which every fund was early, every exit disciplined, every catalyst identified, and no one had ever sat in a lenders' call arguing for the liquidation of a grocery chain to a woman reading the clawback provisions aloud in her ordinary voice. The fund's investors, among whom numbered two pension plans and a university's endowment, read the letter with the attention investors give to returns, and the returns were good, and the letter was filed. It is not the market's business to remember. Memory, in the affair of Fairbank Foods, was kept by other instruments: by the minutes and the archive, by the certification's annual renewal, by the markered headcount on a break-room board, by a tenants' association's report that the store had chicken. And by one more keeper, the least official of all: the register, reprinted annually for the board, in which the lines stood in their flat columns, and in which the name at the head of the term loan's holders remained, through the recovery and toward par, the name of the woman who had been introduced to the company's directors as a person from the bondholder group — the register having acquired, in the company's new customs, the status of a document that is read, which is to say the status of a fact.
Crenshaw Credit Partners held its annual meeting for investors in the autumn, in a hotel room of the anonymous kind her firm favored, with the year's results presented in the manner she had presented them for a decade: the schedule first, the commentary after, the questions taken in the order of the hands. The Fairbank position occupied its customary single line of the schedule, enlarged by events into a paragraph of the commentary — the accumulation, the meeting, the restructuring, the recovery — all of it rendered in the firm's prose, which had the quality, remarked on by more than one investor over the years, of making catastrophes read like weather reports. The position now stood at the threshold of par. The year's return on it, computed and audited, was the kind of figure that makes limited partners gracious, and the graciousness held through the presentation and into the questions, where a trustee of a teachers' pension plan — a woman of Rosalind's own generation, who had been with the firm since its second fund and asked, habitually, the question the room was thinking — asked the question the room was thinking.
Why, she asked, did the firm not sell. The bonds could be sold into the recovery at a price that banked the whole adventure. The company's future was a grocery future, with a grocery's margins and a grocery's God — weather, wages, the price of everything — and the fund's genius, as the year had proved, was in the reading of distress, not in the husbandry of recovery. Would the firm not take its profit and its story and go find another set of documents to read to the bottom?
It was asked with affection, and it was the question the chairman of Fairbank Foods had once answered for her, in his own mind, in the confident spring: she would take her money and go. Rosalind answered it the way she answered examinations, from the documents. The extension, she said, ran five years. The sweep amortized the loan on a schedule the firm's models had tested against the chain's honest numbers — the numbers the company now produced, certified, quarterly, a condition she described as new in the borrower's history and, in her professional judgment, durable, being founded not on a management's promises but on a board's acquired habit of reading its own paper. The covenants folded the fourteen stores' performance into the debt's terms; the position's risk was therefore, in a way almost unknown in distressed credit, supervised by its own collateral's customers. To sell at the threshold of par was to sell the safest years of the loan to a buyer who would price them correctly. The firm would hold. She said it without emphasis, as a statement about a schedule, and the trustee nodded the nod of a woman whose own beneficiaries were, a number of them, shoppers in the stores the covenants kept open — a fact she did not mention, it not being the firm's business, and which Rosalind did not mention either, it not being necessary, both of them being professionals of the school that believes the documents are the decent place for such facts to live.