The invitation, when it came, was addressed to the bondholder group and routed through the company's financial adviser, and it asked the lenders' representatives to attend a meeting at the company's offices to discuss a proposed extension of the maturities — a meeting at which, the letter said, the company would present its plan and request the group's support. Rosalind read the letter twice. Then she asked her general counsel to prepare the signature packet the adviser had circulated, and she put the sheet with the three questions in the pocket of the folder she would carry, and she went on with her afternoon, which included a call with a pension fund in Columbus and the signing of a wholly unrelated consent, in the course of which nobody interrupted her at all.
The chairman of Fairbank Foods was Nathaniel Fairbank, called Nate by everyone including the press releases, and he was the founder's grandson, which in Cincinnati grocery history was a kind of office in itself. He was fifty-two, well kept in the manner of men whose families have been photographed at store openings for three generations, and he carried the company's history the way an heir carries a house he grew up in — with genuine affection for the façade and an incomplete knowledge of the wiring. He had not built the debt, exactly; the debt had been built by a strategy of growth he had championed in rooms where championing was his function, and he had come to understand the company's position the way he understood most difficult things, as a problem of presentation that would yield, in the end, to confidence and the family name.
He ran the board the way he ran the annual meeting, as a ceremony of continuity. The board itself was a portrait of the company's long life: directors who had served through the good decades and regarded the bad one as weather; a hired chief executive, Alan Dreyfus, brought in three years earlier from a packaged-goods company to professionalize the operation, who had discovered that professionalizing a family institution is a slower business than the interview process suggests; a chief financial officer, Howard Zeller, who had risen through the treasury department and knew the debt the way a man knows his own mortgage — every rate, every covenant, every date — and whose knowledge had lately curdled into the particular optimism of a man who has decided which facts the room can bear. There was Faye Dunlop, sixty-eight, chair of the audit committee, a retired audit partner who had spent her career at one of the great firms reading other companies' numbers for a living and who brought to Fairbank's board the stillness of a person who has never once been hurried into a signature. And there was Chuck Pendergast, sixty, a director of the old school, a wholesaler's son, whose contribution to deliberation was a bonhomie that had been useful in the years when the company's problems could be solved by goodwill, and which persisted, unexamined, into the years when they could not.
The extension, as the chairman presented it to his board, was a negotiation the company would win by being itself. The lenders, he said, were funds. Funds wanted yield and certainty, and the company could offer both: a modest fee, a slightly higher coupon, a plan for the stores built around the words disciplined and focused, and the implication — never stated, always present — that the alternative to extension was a bankruptcy in which everyone, lenders included, would spend years discovering how little a grocery chain's assets fetch at auction. He did not regard this as a bluff. He regarded it as the natural order: the company was the enterprise, the lenders were the money, and money, in his experience of the family's ninety years, eventually agreed to be reasonable because the enterprise was real and the money was only money.
What the chairman had not done, in the year of the slide, was read his own company's creditor filings to the bottom. He had been briefed on them — there had been a slide, in a deck, some quarters back, with a chart of the register's largest holders — but the chart had shown fund names, CCL this and a pension vehicle that, and fund names are wallpaper to a man who thinks in enterprises. Had anyone laid the register itself in front of him, printed, with the manager and principal of its largest holder spelled out in the column where such things are spelled out, he might have learned something in time for it to be useful. The register existed. It lived in the treasury department's files and in the signature packet the company's advisers were even then assembling for the meeting. The chairman's relationship to it was the relationship he had to most documents in the building: he was confident that it said what it was supposed to say.