Bank Manager Bet an Elderly Customer He Had No Money — Then the “Poor Man” Revealed He Was the Bank’s CEO

Chapter 12

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The investigation also looked, at Elijah's direction, at the bonus design that had shaped Dean's behavior, because Elijah had always believed that when you want to understand what a person did, you should look at what the person was paid to do. The findings were straightforward, and they were uncomfortable. Dean's bonus had been tied, in part, to the number of new accounts opened at his branch, and to the fee income those accounts generated. There was no check in the bonus formula for whether the accounts had been authorized, or for whether the customers had complained, or for whether the accounts stayed open and active. A branch that opened many accounts and collected many fees looked, on paper, like a branch that was succeeding, and a manager who produced those numbers looked, on paper, like a manager who deserved a bonus. The investigation did not find that anyone at Keystone had designed the bonus to encourage fraud. It found that the bonus had been designed to encourage volume, and that volume, without verification, had created an opportunity, and that Dean had taken it, and that Sandra had protected it, and that the combination had produced one hundred and eighty-seven accounts and thirty-eight thousand dollars in fees, five dollars at a time, from people who had not agreed to any of it. Elijah, reading that section of the report, underlined a sentence with a pencil, the way he had underlined sentences in reports for decades, and wrote in the margin, in his own hand, "Volume without verification is not growth. It is a debt."

The investigation ran for nine weeks in total. About ninety customers were interviewed, and thirty-one staff members, from tellers to regional managers to compliance analysts, and the final report, when it was complete, was a document of considerable length, written in the plain, unadorned language Brian Doherty favored, with findings, evidence, and recommendations separated into sections that a board member could read without a lawyer's help. It found that Dean Kavanagh had opened unauthorized accounts, that Sandra Byrne had pocketed complaints, and that the bonus design had rewarded raw new-account counts without verification. It recommended that Dean be dismissed for cause, that the complaint-handling system be moved out of regional directors' control, that new-account procedures be changed to require a second employee's verification and a mailed confirmation, that signature audits be conducted quarterly on a random sample, that bonuses no longer be tied to raw new-account counts, and that whistleblower protections be written into policy in language an employee could understand without a lawyer. It also recommended that the evidence of falsified signature cards be referred to the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities, the state regulator, for its own review. Elijah approved every recommendation, and he approved the referral, and he understood, and said so to the board, that a referral is not a verdict, and that the regulator would make its own findings, and that Keystone's job was to tell the truth about what it had found and to fix what it could fix, and to let the regulator do what regulators do.

Dean was dismissed for cause in the ninth week, after a meeting with Brian, the general counsel, and a representative from human resources, in which he was shown the findings and given an opportunity to respond, and in which he repeated his claim that customers had agreed verbally. The dismissal letter, which Elijah did not write but did read, cited the unauthorized accounts, the signature mismatches, and the after-hours terminal trail, and it stated, plainly, that the bank had lost confidence in his ability to manage a branch. Dean did not, so far as Elijah knew, appeal. He left the building with a box of personal items, and the branch, which had been his for several years, continued without him, the way branches do, with the same windows and the same carpet and the same bell over the door, but with a different person in the manager's office and a different feeling in the air, which the staff noticed before the customers did, and which the customers noticed soon after.

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Bank Manager Bet an Elderly Customer He Had No Money — Then the “Poor Man” Revealed He Was the Bank’s CEO

45 Part