Kline leaned forward. "Then we find out who prepared it, and who approved it, and who knew the Busan report was outstanding, and we do it before the board meets, because the board will ask, and they will not accept 'I trusted the team' as an answer."
The internal review took the rest of the afternoon, and it moved the way reviews move when people are afraid and honest at the same time: in pieces, with documents produced reluctantly and then all at once. Farah Nasser, the compliance officer, produced her own record first. She had flagged the missing independent report weeks earlier, in writing, to the program director and to the deal team. She had written that the certification cited in the summary was from Pacific Test Labs, that Pacific's funding had not been disclosed, and that the Busan laboratory's final report had not been received. Her message had been answered, she said, by Dennis Vogel, the program director, who had told her that the work was essentially done, that the remaining tests would pass, and that the deal team should not delay a closing over a report that was expected to confirm what everyone already knew.
Vogel, when he was called in, did not deny it. He was fifty-two, a senior engineer who had spent twenty years at Northgate, a man who had built his career on being the person who got things across the finish line. He admitted that he knew the Busan report had not been issued. He said he had told the deal team that the work was essentially complete because he believed the remaining tests would pass and because he believed Nasser's concern was overstated. He said he had signed off on the summary's description of title because he had assumed the patent position had been checked by someone else, and that assumption, he admitted, was his failure, not someone else's.
"Did you know about the Institute license?" Kline asked him.
Vogel was quiet for a long time. "I knew there was a license," he said at last. "I did not know it expired in eighteen months, and I did not know consent was required for a transfer. I should have known. It was in the packet. I did not read the footnote."
"Four people knew the report was outstanding," Kline said, reading from Nasser's record. "You, Nasser, the deal-team lead, and the person who prepared the summary. Four people, and the summary went out anyway."
Vogel nodded. He did not make excuses. He said he had been under pressure to close, that the pressure had come from the top, and that he had mistaken pressure for permission. He said he was sorry, and the sorry sounded real, but it did not undo the summary, and Kline told him so.
By late afternoon, the review had its shape: Vogel had routed the certification through Pacific Test Labs because Pacific was fast and familiar, and he had not disclosed its funding; he had signed off on the title description without reading the footnote; Nasser had warned, in writing, and had been brushed aside; the deal team had used the summary without checking it against the Korean record; and Reid had read the summary, had known it described certification as complete, had known the final document was expected before closing, and had never asked to see it.
Reid, when Kline put that shape in front of him, did not argue with it. "I want Nasser in the review," he said. "The person who raised the concern should be part of finding out what happened, not pushed to the side for having raised it. And I want the technical team given the time to finish the tests without pressure for a particular result. And I want it in writing, from me, that no acquisition statement will be described as complete unless the supporting evidence has been reviewed."
Kline looked at him. "That is a start," he said. "It is not a confession, and it does not erase what happened, but it is a start, and a start is only worth something if what follows it can be checked."