I have been a federal judge for fourteen months. I am forty-three years old. Those two facts are often stated together in introductions, as if the second explains the first, or as if the first requires some apology for the second. I do not offer one. I came to the bench after nearly two decades of practicing law, and I came to it with a record that was already formed, not one I intended to form while sitting here. The robe did not change my understanding of what happens in a courtroom. It changed my responsibility for it.
Before the bench, I was a public defender. That is the first part of my professional life, and it is the part people most often misunderstand. They assume it was an apprenticeship, a period of idealism that would later be corrected by experience. It was not. It was an education in how the criminal process actually operates when no one of consequence is watching it closely. I represented people who had been arrested on the street, in their homes, in their cars, in parking lots and stairwells and kitchens. Many of them were guilty of something. Some were guilty of exactly what they were charged with. Some were guilty of a lesser offense than the one written on the charging document. Some were not guilty at all, and the difference between those categories was not always visible on the first day, or the second, or even after the police reports had been read twice.
What I learned first was not a theory of justice. It was a practice: read the report against itself. Check the time against the dispatch log. Check the location against the map. Check the officer's account of what he saw against what he could have seen from where he stood. Check the number of officers present against the number who wrote reports. The gaps were rarely dramatic. They were small, procedural, and cumulative. A search described as consensual with no consent form. A stop described as brief that lasted forty minutes. A statement described as spontaneous that appeared, word for word, in two separate reports written by two separate officers. I learned to ask questions in that order because the answers, when they came, tended to come in that order as well: first the clarification, then the qualification, then the silence.
I also learned how quickly a defendant could be treated as guilty before anyone had examined the evidence. That treatment did not always announce itself as prejudice. Often it presented as efficiency. A prosecutor would summarize the case before the file had been opened. A judge would ask about a plea before arraignment was complete. A bail recommendation would be made on the basis of the charge alone, as if the charge were a finding. In the hallway, a client would be spoken about as if he were not present, though he was standing three feet away with his hands cuffed in front of him. I watched men and women learn, very early in their cases, that the system had already decided what kind of person they were, and that the trial, if there was one, would be an argument about the details rather than a genuine inquiry into whether the central accusation was true.
That is not an accusation against every prosecutor or every judge I appeared before. I worked with prosecutors who were careful, and judges who were patient, and officers who wrote honest reports even when honesty complicated their cases. I am stating what I observed often enough that it became a pattern I had to account for in my preparation. If I assumed that the evidence would be weighed neutrally simply because a hearing had been scheduled, I would fail my client. I had to build the record myself: subpoena the video, request the radio traffic, interview the witness who had not been listed, photograph the doorway, measure the distance. The work was not glamorous. Much of it was done in offices with poor lighting, on telephones that were answered by people who did not want to be involved, and in waiting rooms where my clients sat beside me and tried not to look frightened.
My clients were not, for the most part, people with resources to correct an error. If a search was unlawful, they could not hire an expert to prove it. If a witness misidentified them, they could not hire an investigator to find the person who had actually been present. If an officer's account shifted between the preliminary hearing and trial, they could not afford a transcript of both proceedings unless I obtained one. That asymmetry shaped my view of the judge's role long before I became a judge. The courtroom is not a level field simply because both sides have a table. It is level only to the extent that the judge insists that it be level, and insists on it early, and insists on it even when insistence is inconvenient.