Other witnesses followed, in smaller ways, and I learned of them only in general terms, as a complainant is entitled to learn that an investigation is proceeding, without being given the substance of every interview. A deputy who had been near the stairwell confirmed the timing. A staff member who had passed through the corridor earlier confirmed the layout and the normal use of the space. No one, to my knowledge, came forward with a sensational addition. No one claimed to have seen more than he or she had seen. That restraint was itself a sign that the process was working. When witnesses feel safe, they do not need to exaggerate. They can afford to be precise, because precision will not be punished, and because the record already holds the larger fact in place.
I also took care, during those first days, to keep the pending criminal case separate from the investigation in my own chambers work. I did not discuss the investigation with counsel in the case except on the record and except for scheduling. I did not permit chambers staff to discuss it with the parties. I directed that all communications about the officers' future testimony go through written filings, so that nothing would be decided by telephone or in a hallway. I set a briefing schedule that gave both sides adequate time, and I stated, in a written order, the same handling I had announced orally: the officers' testimony remained continued, the parties' rights were preserved, any motion for recusal would be decided on the papers with written reasons, and no inference would be drawn from the continuance itself about the merits of either the investigation or the underlying case. A written order matters because oral statements fade and transcripts are not always read in full. An order can be cited, appealed, and reviewed. It anchors the handling in a way that memory cannot.
The oversight process, as I understood it from the notifications I received, moved at the pace such processes move, which is to say deliberately and without daily updates to the complainant. That pace frustrated me at times, as it frustrates anyone who has lived through an incident and wants resolution, but I recognized it as necessary. An investigation that rushes to a conclusion to satisfy the complainant is no more trustworthy than one that rushes to exonerate. The investigators interviewed Voss and Pruitt separately, after advising them of their rights, and they did so without my presence and without input from me about questions. They reviewed the equipment logs. They reviewed the medical documentation. They reviewed the surveillance footage and the telephone recording, and they treated Camille Ross not as a supporting character in a judge's story but as a witness in her own right, whose employment and whose ordinary work that morning deserved protection. I was told, in general terms, that steps were being taken to ensure she would not face adverse action for having been present and for having cooperated, and that any concern she raised about her workplace would be addressed through the proper personnel channels, not through the investigation itself. That separation of tracks, investigation on one side and workplace protection on the other, was important, and I noted it with gratitude, because a witness who fears for her job cannot be a free witness.
Through all of this, I continued to preside over my docket. That may sound unremarkable, but it was the point. A judge who stops working after an incident invites the inference that the incident has disabled the court. A judge who works, carefully, on matters that do not touch the incident, demonstrates that the court is larger than any one morning. I heard motions. I ruled on scheduling. I conducted hearings in other cases. In the pending case itself, I ruled only on matters that did not require me to assess the credibility of Voss or Pruitt, and I stated that limitation each time it applied, so that the record would show restraint rather than avoidance. Restraint is a judicial virtue when it is explained. Avoidance, unexplained, looks like fear. I did not want the record to show fear. I wanted it to show a court managing a difficult intersection of roles with transparency.
There were moments, in chambers, when the discipline of that approach felt thin. I would read a brief in the pending case and see the officers' names, and I would feel the corridor again, not as a memory I could set aside by will but as a fact I had to work around. I did not permit that feeling to become a ruling. I wrote my orders more slowly during that period. I checked citations twice. I asked my law clerk to review drafts for any language that might suggest I had prejudged the investigation or the officers' credibility in the underlying case. That clerk, who had no role in the investigation, became an important check, not because I doubted my own impartiality in the abstract, but because impartiality in a case touched by a personal incident must be demonstrated, not merely asserted. A second pair of eyes on an order is a small safeguard, but small safeguards, accumulated, are what make a record defensible on appeal.