THEY DRAGGED A HELPLESS WOMAN INTO THE COURTHOUSE BASEMENT AND TRIED TO CUT OFF HER HAIR, NOT KNOWING SHE WAS THE FEDERAL JUDGE ASSIGNED TO THEIR TRIAL IN TWENTY MINUTES

Chapter 33

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I also addressed, on the record, the question that every experienced lawyer in the room was already considering: whether I should continue to preside over the case at all. I did not recuse myself on the spot, and I did not refuse to consider recusal. Either extreme would have been wrong. An immediate recusal, announced in the heat of the morning, would have suggested that the incident had already decided the question, and it would have deprived the parties of the chance to make a reasoned record. A refusal to consider it would have suggested indifference to the appearance of impartiality. Instead, I stated that I would remain on the case for the limited, non-testimonial matters that could be handled that morning without touching the officers' credibility, that I invited any party who believed recusal was warranted to file a motion with supporting argument, and that I would decide any such motion on the papers, under the governing standard, with written reasons. I also stated that, if a party preferred, I would refer the recusal question for consideration through the court's ordinary assignment process, without my own preference attached to it. That invitation was not a dodge. It was the procedure working as it is meant to work: the judge states the facts, the parties state their positions, and the decision is made on a record, not in a corridor.

Counsel responded as counsel do when a court is candid with them. The government attorney acknowledged the continuance and asked that the record reflect that the government did not oppose it, and that the government would preserve its right to call the officers at a later date or to proceed by other lawful means. Defense counsel acknowledged it as well, and asked that the record reflect that the defense reserved all rights, including the right to seek recusal, to seek exclusion, or to seek any other relief the rules permitted, without waiving any argument by agreeing to a continuance that day. I granted both requests for the record. I noted that no party was asked to waive anything by proceeding on the limited matters that remained, and that any objection preserved that morning would remain preserved. That exchange, dull as it may read on paper, was the integrity of the case being preserved in real time. It was not dramatic. It was procedural, and procedure is what keeps a trial from becoming a referendum on the judge.

With that foundation laid, I turned to what could properly be done that morning. There were stipulations to be read that did not depend on the officers. There were exhibits whose authenticity had already been established through other custodians. There was scheduling to be set for briefing on the recusal question and on the future handling of the officers' testimony. I handled those matters in the ordinary way, ruling on small points with brief reasons, keeping the pace steady, and adjourning at a reasonable hour so that counsel would have time to consult with their clients and with their offices about the next steps. I did not use the morning to lecture the courtroom about the incident. I did not use it to reassure anyone that justice would be done. Justice, in a courtroom, is not a promise made from the bench. It is a series of correct rulings, made one at a time, that add up to a fair proceeding. That morning, the correct rulings were the continuance, the disclosure, the invitation to brief recusal, and the preservation of every right.

After I adjourned, I did not return immediately to chambers to write a narrative account. I returned to the investigation, through the proper channels, and I did so as a witness and as a complainant, not as a supervisor of it. That distinction mattered to me, and I stated it to Mercer in plain terms. I would give a full statement. I would answer questions. I would produce what I had. I would not direct who was interviewed, in what order, or what conclusions were drawn. I had been a federal judge for fourteen months. I was forty-three years old. I understood the difference between authority over a courtroom and authority over an investigation, and I did not intend to blur it, even with good intentions.

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THEY DRAGGED A HELPLESS WOMAN INTO THE COURTHOUSE BASEMENT AND TRIED TO CUT OFF HER HAIR, NOT KNOWING SHE WAS THE FEDERAL JUDGE ASSIGNED TO THEIR TRIAL IN TWENTY MINUTES

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