The cases that stayed with me longest were not necessarily the most serious charges. They were the cases where the evidence was thin and the process was heavy. A young man charged on the basis of an identification made under suggestive circumstances. A woman charged after a search of a shared residence to which she had not consented and over which she had limited control. A worker charged after an encounter that began as a request for identification and escalated, in minutes, into an arrest. In each instance, the legal issues were familiar: identification procedure, consent, scope of a search, probable cause. What made the cases difficult was not the doctrine. It was the imbalance of resources and the imbalance of credibility. The prosecution had the report, the laboratory, the officer, and the institutional presumption that the arrest had been lawful. The defense had the client, and whatever I could assemble in the time allowed.
I learned, in that period, to value the contemporaneous record above all else. Memory fades and revises itself. A dispatch recording does not. A photograph taken that night does not. A medical record created at intake does not. A receipt, a time stamp, a surveillance frame — these are not glamorous exhibits, but they do not change their story to suit the questioner. I became meticulous about preservation letters, about requesting video before it was overwritten, about interviewing witnesses while their recollection was still tied to the event rather than to later conversations about it. That meticulousness was not a personality trait. It was a response to a repeated experience: by the time a case reached a hearing, the most useful evidence was often the evidence that had already disappeared.
I also learned to listen to clients in a particular way. A client who had been through the system before often spoke in shorthand, omitting details he assumed I would know or would not believe. A client who had never been arrested often spoke in a flood, including everything, unable to distinguish between what mattered legally and what mattered to him personally. In both cases, my task was the same: to slow the account down, to separate observation from conclusion, to ask what the client saw, what he heard, what was said verbatim, and what he inferred afterward. That discipline mattered because the court would later do the same thing, less patiently, and under cross-examination. If I had not already tested the account in my office, it would not survive testing in court.
There were judges in those years who taught me, by example, what judicial restraint looked like. They did not rush a suppression hearing. They did not accept a prosecutor's characterization of a video they had not watched. They asked the officer to point to the exact moment, on the recording or in the report, when probable cause arose. They asked the defense to identify the exact constitutional basis for the motion, rather than allowing a general objection to stand in for an argument. Those judges were not lenient in the sense of being permissive. They were rigorous in the sense of requiring proof. I admired that rigor, and I tried, when I later took the bench, to reproduce it without imitating any individual judge's manner. Rigor, I concluded, is not a style. It is a habit of asking for the record before reaching the conclusion.
There were also proceedings that taught me the opposite lesson, though I state it here without naming anyone. A hearing conducted as if the outcome were predetermined. A motion denied from the bench without findings. A witness interrupted before she could finish an answer because her answer was inconvenient to the schedule. I do not recount these as grievances. I recount them as warnings to myself. The schedule is not more important than the testimony. Efficiency is not a substitute for findings. A court that decides quickly but without explaining itself has not saved time. It has merely deferred the cost of its decision to appeal, or to the next case, or to the public's confidence in the process.