A Police Officer Slapped a Black Woman in the Courthouse, Certain She Was a Criminal—Until a Bailiff Called Her “Your Honor” and Exposed His Secret

Chapter 26

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I think about what that means, in practical terms. It means that Miller came to this courthouse on a morning when a woman was scheduled to appear at nine, and he came looking for her with a description that could have matched any number of people, and with no image of her face to check himself against. It means that the only verification available to him was the verification he would have done after he stopped someone — after he approached them, after he spoke to them, after he had already decided, in his own mind, that they were the person he was looking for. He would have verified only after. The sequence matters. The sequence is the whole story.

If you stop a person first and verify second, you have already made the decision that matters. You have already treated them as the person you are looking for. You have already spoken to them as if they have done something, or failed to do something, that justifies being stopped. The verification, when it comes, is not a safeguard. It is an afterthought. It is a way of confirming what you have already assumed, rather than a way of testing whether the assumption was correct.

"Do you know what he said to Thomas?" I ask. "About how he identified me?"

Margaret shakes her head. "Thomas's account was brief. He said Miller was insistent. He said Miller did not ask for identification before he acted."

"He did not ask," I say. It is not a question. I was there. I know what he did and did not do. He did not ask for my name. He did not ask for identification. He did not pause to consider whether the woman walking toward her courtroom with a folded calendar might be someone other than the woman he was looking for. He acted, and the acting came first.

Margaret is quiet for a moment, and I can see her thinking, the way she thinks when she is presiding and a lawyer has just said something that changes the shape of a case. She is not reacting. She is considering. She is placing this fact alongside the other facts — the check-in before nine, the absence of a warrant, the description, the lack of a photograph — and she is seeing the pattern they form.

"He would have verified only after," she says finally, echoing my own thought, and I am grateful to her for saying it aloud, because it means I am not the only person in this room who sees it.

"Yes," I say. "He would have verified only after. And by then, it would have been too late."

And then the question comes back to me, the question that will not go away. It has been with me since the hallway, since the moment Miller's hand made contact with my face and I understood, in a way I had never understood before, what it meant to be on the receiving end of a power I had spent my career asking courts to restrain. The question is simple. It is the simplest question in the world, and it is the hardest one I have ever had to sit with.

Would it have been acceptable if I were Maya Reynolds?

I do not say it aloud, not yet. I let it sit in my mind, and I turn it over, the way I turn over a piece of evidence before I decide what weight to give it. Would it have been acceptable if I were Maya Reynolds? If I had been the defendant scheduled to appear at nine, if I had checked in before nine, if there had been no warrant issued that morning, if I had been walking toward a courtroom in dark clothing, would it have been acceptable for an officer to stop me on the basis of that description, to speak to me the way Miller spoke to me, to strike me the way he struck me? Would the absence of a robe, the absence of a title, the absence of fifteen years on the bench, have made the difference between an outrage and a routine encounter?

I know the answer. I have always known the answer. The answer is no. It would not have been acceptable. It would not have been acceptable for Maya Reynolds, and it would not have been acceptable for anyone else. A description is not a warrant. A category is not an identification. A scheduled appearance is not a justification for force. The fact that I am a judge does not make what happened to me worse in principle than it would have been if it had happened to her. It makes it more visible. It makes it harder to ignore. It makes it impossible for the courthouse to handle privately, because the person it happened to is one of its own. But the principle is the same, and the principle does not depend on who is wearing the robe.

Margaret is watching me. She has been watching me while I think, and she has not interrupted, and I am grateful for that, too. She knows when to let a person think, and she knows when thinking has become something that needs to be spoken aloud.

"You're thinking about Maya Reynolds," she says. It is not a question.

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A Police Officer Slapped a Black Woman in the Courthouse, Certain She Was a Criminal—Until a Bailiff Called Her “Your Honor” and Exposed His Secret

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