Margaret and I did not write these changes as a press release. We wrote them as an administrative order, in plain language, with effective dates and responsible parties and a review date six months out. Evelyn typed it. Thomas read it and made a note about the bailiffs' radio procedure that improved it. I signed it. Margaret signed it. It went into the file, and it went to the people who needed to implement it, and it stayed there, where a future morning could find it.
That was the work after the morning. Not grand. Not dramatic. Concrete and procedural, because concrete and procedural is what lasts. A speech fades. A policy, implemented and reviewed, does not.
And then, when the order was signed and the findings were filed and the referral had gone out, I was left with the question that will not go away.
Would it have been acceptable if I were Maya Reynolds?
I had asked it in the minutes after I was struck, standing in the corridor with my cheek stinging and my papers on the floor, looking at Miller and understanding, in a way I had not understood before, that he had come for a woman who looked like me in the ways that mattered to him — dark clothing, about forty, fourth floor — and that he had not cared enough to check whether I was her. I had asked it in my chambers afterward, with Evelyn's hand on my shoulder and Thomas standing in the doorway. I had asked it in the days that followed, when the crowd's recording circulated and strangers wrote to the court to say they were sorry, and I wondered what those same strangers would have said if the woman in the recording had not worn a robe. I ask it now, and I know the answer differently than I knew it then, because now the answer has been lived through, not just asked.
No. It would not have been acceptable if I were Maya Reynolds. It would not have been acceptable if I were any woman who checked in before nine for a case before Judge Bennett. It would not have been acceptable if I were a tenant who had filed a complaint about a loose railing and a dark stairwell. It would not have been acceptable if I were a defendant, or a witness, or a clerk, or a visitor who had taken a wrong turn on the fourth floor. The robe did not make what happened to me worse. The robe made it visible. That is the difference, and it is a terrible difference to have to name.
Fifteen years as a public defender taught me to see the courthouse from the other side of the bench. I sat next to people who had been stopped on the street because they matched a description. I sat next to people who had been held because a report had been buried or a form had been lost. I sat next to people who had learned, the hard way, that the system works best for the people who already know how it works, and that everyone else learns it by being hurt by it. I took the bench believing that I could carry that knowledge with me, that I could be the kind of judge who remembered what it was to sit at counsel table and wait for someone in a robe to decide whether to believe you. I still believe that. But that morning taught me that remembering is not enough. You have to build the memory into the procedure, so that it does not depend on which judge happens to be on the bench that day, or which officer happens to be in the corridor.
The people who gathered in the hallways that morning gathered for two very different reasons. Some gathered because they wanted to help. They were the ones who picked up my papers, who held the door, who offered water, who stood between me and the crowd without being asked, who said, quietly, that they had seen what happened and would say so if asked. They were clerks and attorneys and members of the public who had come for their own cases and stayed to be witnesses. They did not make a speech about it. They simply stayed. And some gathered because they wanted to make sure they did not become the next person involved. They were the ones who looked away, who stepped back, who left the corridor quickly, who said later that they had not seen anything, that they had not been there, that they could not be sure. I do not judge them harshly. Fear is a rational response in a courthouse when a uniform has just struck a judge and no one yet knows what will happen next. But I remember the difference, and I carry it with me, because the courthouse needs more of the first kind of gathering and fewer of the second, and the only way to get there is to make it safe to stay.